te er rg go ov ve er rn nm me en nt ta al l f fi is sc ca al l t tr ra an ns sf fe er rs s a as s p po or rk k b ba ar rr re el l" " 
Introduction
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are financed by broad-based taxation but generate benefits that are geographically limited. Previous studies have demonstrated that governments take their own interests, specifically, electoral successes, into account when allocating grants to lower levels of governments (e.g., Johansson, 2003; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008) . The existence of political motivations in grant allocation may generate welfare losses, excessive government spending, and inequities (see Boadway and Shah, 2006) . However, there has been little empirical study of the political determinants of increases in intergovernmental grants in pre-electoral periods or of the electoral benefits of grantfunded pork barrel for incumbent politicians (Ferejohn, 1974) .
This paper tries fills this gap in the literature by analyzing an extensive dataset that covers legislative elections in Portugal. The data set spans the period from the restoration of democracy in 1974 until 2005 and covers 278 mainland Portuguese municipalities. Portugal is an interesting case study because transfers from the central government represent an important source of funding for municipalities, and because all municipalities have identical institutional structures and policy concerns. Additionally, legislative elections dates are defined exogenously from the perspective of the government. Veiga and Pinho (2007) found strong evidence of increases in intergovernmental fiscal transfers during election years in Portugal. The present paper analyses the determinants of pork-barrel spending in the allocation of grants by the Portuguese central government to local jurisdictions, and also the efficacy of those grants in producing votes for the incumbent government. If grants are used strategically to enhance re-election probabilities, then the incentive to manipulate grants should be 2 stronger when the incumbent is lagging behind opposition candidates. This suggests that the determinants of re-election prospects and pork barrel spending measures should be analyzed simultaneously in empirical studies. But, to the best of our knowledge, that has not been done so far.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the literature on pork barrel policies and voting functions. Section 3 introduces the Portuguese institutional background. The data and the econometric model are described in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results and, finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
Review of the literature
An important question in political economy is how economic events affect voting behavior. The theory's starting point is the responsibility hypothesis (Downs, 1957) : voters hold the Government responsible for economic outcomes. This relationship is reflected in voting functions, which explain vote support for incumbents with variables measuring economic and political conditions. The first papers on this topic appeared in the 1970s (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Mueller, 1970; and, Kramer, 1971) . Since then many papers have followed, analyzing specific countries or panels of countries, but with most studies use aggregate data. 1 The number of papers estimating the impact of local conditions on electoral results is rather small and focuses primarily on the US and the UK. 2 For the Portuguese case, Veiga and Veiga (forthcoming) found that the performance of the national economy is important for legislative election 1 For surveys on economic voting see Duch and Stevenson (2008), and Paldam (2004) .
2 Among others, see Holbrook (1991) , Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) , Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) 3 results, but that local economic conditions also influence electoral outcomes. Building on the previous paper, we investigate how changes in transfers to municipalities influence electoral results and whether these transfers are used as a political tool to win elections.
According to the first generation literature on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1999 ) the two main normative objectives for intergovernmental fiscal transfers are the enhancement of efficiency and a more equitable allocation of resources among local jurisdictions. More recently, a second generation of fiscal federalism studies 3 has emerged that "examines the workings of different political and fiscal institutions in a setting of imperfect information and control with a basic focus on the incentives that these institutions embody and the resulting behaviour they induce from utilitymaximizing participants" (Oates, 2005, p. 356 ). In such a setting, the distribution of central government resources among local jurisdictions may also be influenced by positive considerations, such as the enhancement of the incumbent re-election probabilities (Ferejohn, 1974) , and the satisfaction of powerful interest groups (Olson, 1965) .
Two alternative theories have been put forward by the literature on redistributive politics that can be applied to the study of intergovernmental grants as a political tool.
According to Weibull (1987, 1993) and Dixit and Londgren (1998) upper-layer governments should allocate more money towards swing regions where voters do not have a strong attachment to either the government or opposition parties. In contrast, Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that central governments are risk averse, and therefore invest where they already have a strong support.
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Several papers have tested these two theories and found that, besides local expenditure needs and local fiscal capacity, political factors play an important role in the allocation of per capita intergovernmental grants among local jurisdictions. For the Swedish case, Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003) found strong evidence in favour of the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) model. Case (2001) found that, in Albania, more assistance was allocated not only to swing communes but also to those that might be pivotal to winning a majority of seats in Parliament. For the US, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) found that states transfer more to local governments that provide them with the strongest electoral support, and found little or no evidence in favor of the swing voter model. The Portuguese case was investigated by Veiga and Pinho (2007) . Their results present strong evidence of grant increases during election years, and that municipalities with many swing voters received more grants, particularly during the early years of democracy.
This paper improves on the previous literature by simultaneously analysing how grant increases in electoral years produce votes, and how electoral prospects influence opportunistic behaviour in the distribution of grants.
Institutional background
Democracy [Insert Table 1 7 However, even for formula transfers, until 1998 the central government could influence the total amount distributed, which means that it could use them for electoral purposes.
Data and econometric model
The dataset The main purpose of our empirical analysis is to test the following hypotheses:
(1) election-year increases in grants transferred to a municipality lead to higher vote shares for the government; and, (2) 
(2) i = 1, ..., 278 is the index for municipalities, t indicates time, α and γ are constants, β 1 -β 6 and φ 1 -φ 9 are parameters to be estimated, ν i and λ i are the individual effects of municipality i, δ t and φ t are dummy variables for the election of year t, and ε it and µ it are the errors terms.
In the voting function (1), election year increases in real per capita grants transferred by the central government to municipalities (∆Grants it ) are expected to improve re-election prospects. Transfers represent the main source of funding for municipalities and condition expenditure decisions that generate welfare gains for the citizens. Higher average total grants per capita received by the local government over 9 the entire term of the Government (Grant_Mean it ) are also expected to increase votes.
Thus, we expect positive signs for β 1 and β 2 .
Since governments with a larger support base tend to have more swing voters, a negative sign is expected for the coefficient (β 3 ) associated with the share in votes in the previous election (Votes it-1 ). In order to evaluate if voters prefer not to concentrate all the power in one party, we included a dummy variable (Same_Party it ) which takes the value of one when the mayor's party is in the national government, and equals zero otherwise. Following Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) , a negative sign is expected for β 4 .
According to Veiga and Veiga (2004) , Portuguese voters hold governments responsible for the evolution of the economy. There is also evidence that they are myopic, namely that events that occurred in the recent past are more important determinants of voting behavior than those that occurred longer ago. Thus, the change in the vote share of the government party from one election to the next is very likely to be affected by changes in macroeconomic variables, such as consumer prices and unemployment rates in the year before elections. Concretely, we expect that positive percentage changes in consumer prices (Inflation t-1 ) and in unemployment rates (∆Unemp_Rate t-1 ) will lead to decreases in vote shares of the government party Therefore, a negative sign is expected for the coefficient (φ 1 ) associated with ∆Votes it , which proxies the expected change in votes, estimated in equation (1). Since large increases in grants are harder where they are already large, a negative sign is expected for the coefficient (φ 2 ) associated with real total grants per capita in the year prior to the election (Grant i,t-1 ).
To test Cox and McCubbins' (1986) hypothesis that electoral increases in grants are higher to municipalities where the government has stronger political support, a dummy for party similarity between the government and the mayor (Same_Party it ), and a variable measuring the share in votes in the previous election (Votes it-1 ) were included.
Positive signs of both coefficients, φ 3 and φ 4 , are expected.
When a majority of the deputies in parliament belongs to the government party, budgets that allow for electoral manipulation of intergovernmental grants are more likely to be approved. This hypothesis is tested by including in the model the dummy variable Majority it , which takes the value of one for governments having a majority at the National Assembly (Parliament), and equals zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient (φ 5 ) is expected to be positive.
Pop i,t-1 represents a municipality's population, in thousands. The bigger the population of a municipality is, the costlier it is for the government to increase the grants per capita transferred to it. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected for φ 6 . 
Population squared (Pop

SD(VOTES it )
, is used to test Lindbeck and Weibull's (1993) hypothesis that politicians target swing voters. 9 A positive estimated coefficient (φ 9 ) is expected.
Descriptive statistics of the variables referred to above are presented in Table 2 .
The mean of the growth in total grants per capita from the pre-electoral year to the electoral period is 9.85 euros of 2000, while for the whole sample is 5.11, which supports the hypothesis that central governments behave opportunistically. A positive value is also observed for the growth in current and capital grants, with the latter almost doubling the former. This suggests a larger manipulation of capital grants than of current grants, which is accordance with evidence provided by Veiga and Veiga (2007b) of larger political business cycles in municipal capital expenditures than in current expenditures.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Equations (1) and (2) 
Empirical results
The systems of simultaneous equations were estimated using Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) on a panel of 278 municipalities, over ten national legislative elections (1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, and 2005) .
Estimations were performed controlling for fixed effects of municipalities and electionspecific effects. 12 The results of the estimation of Equation (1) are shown in Table 3 -A, and those of Equation (2) in Table 3 -B.
13
The results shown in Table 3 -A provide strong evidence that increases in intergovernmental grants in electoral years improve political outcomes. According to the results of column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the growth of real total grants per capita increases the vote share of the government party by approximately 1 (=0.03*33.52) percentage point, which is by no means a negligible effect. Furthermore, if we take into account the fact that there are many cases in which total grants more than double in the election year, the opportunistic manipulation of intergovernmental transfers may be capable of affecting the outcome of close elections.
The average level of grants received by a municipality over the governments' term does not seem to influence electoral outcomes, suggesting that voters are myopic:
11 In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the GMM estimator brings efficiency gains relative to ThreeStage Least Squares (3SLS), another alternative method of estimation of systems of simultaneous equations.
12 One election year dummy must be dropped for each national macroeconomic variable included. 13 Although it would be preferable to show all results in just one table, it would imply using a very small font size, which would make results hard to read. Thus, we opted to split Table 3 in two tables, one for each equation.
13 they only reward increases in spending close to elections, not the level of spending over an entire term. As expected, governments lose more votes in municipalities were they had higher vote shares in previous elections, but party similarity between the mayor and the government does not seem to affect votes. National economic performance strongly conditions electoral outcomes, supporting the hypothesis that voters hold incumbents responsible for the evolution of the economy. This result is consistent with the evidence in favour of the responsibility hypothesis found in most of the vote/popularity functions literature.
The results for the determinants of pork barrel measures, shown in Table 3 -B,
reveal that municipalities where the government expects votes to increase less, or to decrease more, (lower ∆Votes it ) benefit from higher increases in grants in election years.
That is, grants are used strategically to win elections. A one standard deviation reduction in the vote share leads to an increase in total grants per capita of approximately 13 (=-1.13*11.57) percentage points.
We also find evidence that governments target municipalities with higher percentages of the population over 65 years old (with lower education and voter awareness). There is a U-shaped statistical relationship between changes in grants and municipal population, with the turning point at about 420,000 inhabitants. The negatively sloped part of this relationship is due to financial constraints: it is costlier to increase grants per capita in more populous municipalities. The positively sloped part reveals that central governments assign more political importance to winning votes in Lisbon, the Portuguese capital, which is the only municipality with more than 420,000
inhabitants. Finally, as expected, changes in grants depend negatively on the amount transferred in the pre-electoral year.
Percentage changes in grants do not seem to depend on the support received in the previous election, on party similarity between the mayor and the government, on the incidence of swing voters, or on whether the government is majoritarian or not.
The results of a more parsimonious model are shown in column 2 of Real GDP Growth is used in the estimation of column 3, while Growth of the Industrial Production Index is used in that of column 4. Both are highly statistically significant, with the expected positive sign. That is, as anticipated, higher growth rates of GDP or of the industrial production index, both indicating better economic performance, lead to higher vote shares for the government. The results concerning the other explanatory variables are very similar to those shown in column 2.
To check the robustness of the results to a change in the system estimation method, we also performed the estimations using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), which is the asymptotically efficient estimator for linear and nonlinear simultaneous models, under the assumption that the disturbances are multivariate normal. When this assumption fails, FIML may still be asymptotically efficient. The results obtained when using this alternative system estimation method are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 (A and B). They are very similar to those of columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 (obtained using GMM). Thus, regardless of the system 15 estimation method chosen, there is clear empirical support for the theoretical predictions.
15
All estimations referred to above were performed using real total grants per capita. It is interesting to check if similar results are obtained when considering only capital grants or current grants. Since Veiga and Veiga (2007b) found empirical evidence of political business cycles in municipal capital expenditures, namely in investment expenditures highly visible to the electorate, but not in current expenditures, we anticipate that the strategic allocation of grants by the national government is stronger for capital grants than for current grants. 16 The results obtained when considering capital grants only are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 (A and B).
They are very similar to those of columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 These results are consistent with those of Veiga and Veiga (2007a) , who show that the opportunistic election-year behaviour of mayors pays off in terms of increased vote shares when spending consists of investment items such as overpasses, streets, rural roads, and other constructions. Since they do not find evidence that increases in municipal current expenditures lead to larger votes shares, it is no surprise that governments do not strategically manipulate the transfers of current grants, but do so for capital grants.
Conclusion
Several studies have demonstrated that intergovernmental grants tend to increase during balloting years. However, the determinants of the distribution of these pork barrel grants, as well as their political return, have received very little attention.
Elections provide a mechanism for citizens to express their preferences and to hold politicians accountable for economic conditions. However, in centralized countries like Portugal, democracy also creates political incentives for central governments to distribute more "pork" during electoral periods, particularly to jurisdiction where they are in greater danger of losing votes.
Using a sample of all Portuguese mainland municipalities, and covering ten elections , we find strong evidence that electoral year increases in intergovernmental grants pay off in terms of electoral support, and that the central government targets municipalities where it expects greater losses of votes. Consistent with the responsibility hypothesis, the results also reveal that legislative political outcomes in municipalities are influenced by the macroeconomic situation of the country. Therefore, a policy recommendation that can be extracted from our research is that it would be desirable to attribute more financial independence to local governments That is, to adopt decentralization measures that reduce the degree of fiscal discretion of central governments to use transfers as a political tool to win elections. Notes: Systems of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM. Models estimated with municipal and election-year dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: **1%; and *, 5%. Notes: Systems of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM. Models estimated with municipal and electionyear dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: **1%; and *, 5%. Notes: Systems of simultaneous equations estimated with municipal and election-year dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: **1%; and *, 5%.
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